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What is not served?

Each entry shipped or was asked for, and is not here. Check the reason before you add one back.

What was removed, and why

Removed Reason
the directory's API listener and the TokenReview between the two services one consumer, now the same process. The endpoint returns when a second consumer exists
the console layer of the policy and the memberships table a second source of truth beside git. The key is refused now, not ignored
SetOAuthClient the client is a Secret, delivered like every other credential
the /account page the console is same-origin and already shows both halves
the device flow both headless cases, a CI job and a workload, use token exchange
client credentials a machine with a stored secret is what this design avoids
a client secret an operator makes up and delivers the issuer generates it (secret: {generate: true}): how to. The named input stays
JWT bearer (RFC 7523) token exchange with a different spelling
introspection (RFC 7662) the tokens are JWTs, verified offline against the key set
dynamic client registration (RFC 7591) an endpoint that mints trust. A client this installation does not deploy identifies itself with a Client ID Metadata Document, and an allow-list of origins guards it
the implicit and hybrid flows superseded by code with PKCE
take over from git for a Slack channel one channel would have two definitions. A channel defined in both places is held: see the Slack reconciler
slack.workspaces.<key>.team_id, .domains, .owner and github.<org>.owner in the policy each is known at run time. The loader refuses them and names the new source
a Slack Connect record's from internal groups Slack Connect channels are fed by directory groups. A record with internal groups is listed invalid
guest-side probe of every shared channel it cost a call per other workspace per unmanaged channel per pass. Only managed channels are probed
TokenReview for workload exchange it needs a kubeconfig per cluster. A published key set needs none. It stays for recovery alone
the proxy chart It left in v1.32.0 (ADR 0003). A console with no OpenID flow of its own uses gateway-native OIDC or upstream oauth2-proxy

What was never served?

The session-management iframe, front-channel logout, PAR, DPoP, mTLS and CIBA. Each is surface without a consumer. Back-channel logout is served for a client that runs its own session and opts in: see back-channel logout.

Decided in

  • ADR 0003: Deprecate and remove the proxy chart
  • ADR 0018: Do not configure what the product knows
  • ADR 0020: A channel defined twice is held
  • ADR 0023: The guest-side probe asks only about managed channels
  • ADR 0071: One process per credential holder
  • ADR 0039: The issuer generates confidential client secrets